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I. INTRODUCTION
C OMMERCIAL JET airline service has been commonplace
for more than thirty years. While the occasional accident
can send a wave of trepidation through the air traveler commu-
nity, most of us probably do not question the basic soundness of
the design of the aircraft we ride. China Airlines flight 583, on
April 6, 1993, from Beijing to Los Angeles, however, caused the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to question the design of
the McDonnell Douglas MD-11 commercial transport.' While
flying at cruise altitude about five hours into a trans-Pacific
flight, the aircraft unexpectedly began to pitch up and down
with +/- 2g forces, 2 throwing unbelted passengers around the
cabin for over a minute. Ultimately, "[t]wo passengers died of
head injuries, one was paralyzed, and one flight attendant suf-
fered severe brain damage," and of the 255 total passengers,
sixty sustained serious injuries.3 As a result of this and other
MD-11 incidents, the FAA instituted a "special certification re-
view" (SCR) of the MD-11 "center[ing] on the aircraft's high-
altitude handling characteristics."4 Investigation revealed that
the trouble started with an inadvertent slat deployment during
cruise: When the aircraft pitched up in response to the slat
deployment, the pilot over-controlled in his push forward con-
trol response. 6 The ensuing pilot-induced-oscillation was the
source of ninety seconds of porpoising flight.7 While the source
of the oscillation was the pilot, the explanation for the upset lay
with the lateral stability of the aircraft and light control forces-
both functions of the aircraft design.8
I NATIONAL TRANSP. SAFETY BD., AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT, NTSB/AAR-93/
07, INADVERTENT IN-FLIGHT SLAT DEPLOYMENT, CHINA EASTERN AIRLINES FLIGHT
583, 950 NAUTICAL MILES SOUTH OF SHEMYA, ALASKA, APRIL 6, 1993 (1993) [here-
inafter NTSB/AAR-93/07].
2 The acceleration of gravity is called one "g" and is equal to 9.8 meters/sec2 of
acceleration. A pitch "force" of plus 2g's would cause a person to feel twice as
heavy as normal.
3 Peter Garrison, High-Altitude MD-11 Upset Is Disastrous, FLYING, May 1994, at
52.
4 Edward H. Phillips, NTSB: Pilots Need Training for High-Altitude Stalls, AVIA-
TION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 21, 1994, at 43.
5 NTSB/AAR-93/07, supra note 1, at 1.
6 Garrison, supra note 3, at 52.
7 Id.
8 Most civil aircraft are designed to be statically stable so that active control is
not required to maintain a flight altitude. The FAA has certification require-
ments pertaining to stability, and an aircraft's stability characteristics are ex-
amined during certification. Due to conscious design choices, the MD-11
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As illustrated with the MD-11 situation, when warranted, the
NTSB can recommend, and the FAA can institute, an SCR of an
aircraft design. These certification reviews are instituted only
rarely, usually following an unexplained accident or a series of
accidents with similar circumstances. 9 Although the design of
the particular aircraft has been previously certified under all ap-
plicable FAA regulations, in SCR investigations the design is
"operates in the cruise regime with less stability margin than some other trans-
port category airplanes. DAC [Douglas Aircraft Corporation] refers to this as
'relaxed stability."' NATIONAL TRANSP. SAFETY BD., AIRCRAFT INCIDENT REPORT,
NTSB/AAR-94/02, IN-FLIGHT TURBULENCE ENCOUNTER AND Loss OF PORTIONS OF
THE ELEVATORS CHINA AIRLINES FLIGHT CI-012 20 (1994) [hereinafter NTSB/
AAR-94/02]. The MD-11 design review revealed that the light control inputs by
the pilot could "produce larger than desired flight loads unless the pilots are very
careful" and that "there are no certification tests or objective measures to specifi-
cally assess the airplane's susceptibility to pilot overcontrol." Id.
It may surprise some readers to learn that the basic airworthiness of a large
passenger aircraft, like those regularly used by U.S. carriers for daily commercial
flights, can suddenly come into doubt, as here with the MD-11. The MD-1i, how-
ever, is not the first heavy transport aircraft to be subject to an SCR. In 1979, all
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 series aircraft were grounded following the crash of
American Airlines flight 191 which went down just 31 seconds after departing
from Chicago's O'Hare field. David M. North, DC-1O Type Certificate Lifted, AVIA-
TION WK. & SPACE TECH.,June 11, 1979, at 47. In that crash, 259 passengers, 13
crew members, and 3 persons on the ground were killed after the left wing
mounted engine separated from its attachment during the takeoff roll, critically
damaging control systems in the process. Id. Not only were all DC-10s grounded,
the FAA Administrator issued an emergency order suspending the type certificate
for the DC-10. NATIONAL TRANsP. SAFETY BD., AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT,
NTSB/AAR-79/17, AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., DC-10-10, NllOAA, CHICAGO-
O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, MAY 25, 1979 47 (1979)
[hereinafter NTSB/AAR-79/17]. Suspending the type certificate of the DC-10
was nearly unprecedented in 1979. David M. North, Conquest Certification Review
Planned, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 28, 1977, at 19. An FAA official com-
mented during the Cessna Conquest investigation in 1977 that he was only aware
of two other instances where an aircraft certification had been revoked-these
were the McDonnell Douglas DC-6 and the Lockheed Model 049 Constellation.
Id. The emergency order over the DC-10 was eventually lifted when the formal
investigation showed that the aircraft met the requirements for the type certifi-
cate and concluded that "the certification of the DC-10 was carried out in accord-
ance with the rules in effect at the time." NTSB/AAR-79/17, supra, at 47-58. The
DC-10 is a large, "wide-body" transport, over 181 feet long, with a wing span of
155 feet and a maximum take off weight of 455,000 pounds. JANE'S ALL THE
WORLD'S AIRCRAFT 1986-87 457 (Jane's Publishing Co. Ltd. 1987) [hereinafter
JANE'S]. It was originally certified in 1971. Id. at 456. The DC-10 aircraft are still
in wide use today.
9 David M. North, NTSB Urges MU-2 Certfication Review, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Sept. 12, 1983, at 60. In researching this article, the author found less
than 15 aircraft models mentioned in all the literature reviewed that had been
subject to an SCR.
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again subjected to testing, documentation, and evaluation to
confirm the safety of the design and conformance with certifica-
tion criteria. The aircraft may be grounded or subject to opera-
tional limitations during the course of the SCR. One of the
more recent SCR investigations involved the ATR-72 commuter
aircraft.10 Other designs that have been subject to an SCR in-
clude the Robinson R22/44 helicopters; designs certified under
Part 2311 such as the Mitsubishi MU-2, the Piper Malibu, the
Beechcraft Bonanza, and the Cessna 441 Conquest; as well as
designs certified under Part 25 such as the Douglas DC-10 and
Douglas MD-i 1. In nearly all of the SCR cases reviewed, the air-
craft design was vindicated following the investigation without
finding any fundamental design flaws.' 2
One main purpose of this Comment is to explain and explore
the SCR-a little known weapon in the FAA regulatory arse-
nal-and to illustrate how the SCR fits into the overall federal
aviation regulatory picture. Specific areas of interest include
how the SCR fits into the aircraft certification/airworthiness
puzzle; how the SCR process impacts pilot certification and
training; under what circumstances the FAA may institute an
SCR; and the impact on aircraft designs that have come under
the SCR scrutiny. An additional legal question raised is whether
the SCR process impacts federal preemption in the area of avia-
tion law and aircraft design certification.
This Comment reviews the extent of regulations pertaining to
aircraft design, certification, and production and explains how
the SCR fits into the total picture of initial and ongoing govern-
ment regulation over aircraft design and operation. Also pro-
vided is some background on the accident histories of two
aircraft models to illustrate how those accidents or circum-
10 The ATR-72 was the type of aircraft involved in the American Eagle fatal
crash near Chicago on October 31, 1994. Following that accident, the FAA
banned flights into actual or forecasted icing conditions while icing characteris-
tics were being studied. Ramon Lopez & Gilbert Sedbon, ATR Says Ice Tests Show
No Danger with ATR 72, FLIGHT INT'L, Jan. 4, 1995. The Avions de Transport Re-
gionale consortium (ATR) is the consortium that builds the ATR. The consor-
tium consists of France's Aerospatiale and Italy's Alenia. Edward H. Phillips,
NTSB Studies Jetstream Crash, ATR Icing Data, AIR TRANSPORT, Jan. 2, 1995, at 28.
11 The sections of FAA regulations that pertain to airworthiness standards for
normal, utility, and acrobatic category airplanes are 14 C.F.R. §§ 23.1-.1589, app.
A-I (1996). These sections are referred to collectively as "Part 23." Other se-
quences of regulations from 14 C.F.R. pertaining to other subjects are also re-
ferred to by their respective "Part."
12 See infra part III (reviewing SCR investigations into various aircraft types).
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stances brought those designs under SCR examination. Finally,
the question of federal preemption in the area of aircraft design
is analyzed. This preemption analysis includes a historical look
at cases raising federal preemption in aircraft design and dis-
cusses the argument that the existence of the SCR process and
FAA reexamination power is evidence of an intent that state ac-
tion was to be preempted by the federal aviation laws.
II. AIRCRAFT DESIGN AND PRODUCTION
CERTIFICATION
A. AIRCRAFT CATEGORIES, CLASSES, AND DEFINITIONS
Aircraft are classified by category, class, and type, and regula-
tions pertaining to aircraft design, production, and operation
are segregated according to these classification divisions.' 3 The
largest division is the "category" which differentiates the aircraft
principally on the means of obtaining lift. The categories of air-
craft include: lighter-than-air, glider, rotorcraft, and airplane. 4
Lighter-than-air aircraft include the balloon, blimp, and dirigi-
ble. 5 Gliders are aircraft "whose free flight does not depend
principally on an engine."' 6 Rotorcraft include both gyroplanes
and helicopters. The largest group of aircraft, however, are the
airplanes.
A closer distinction between aircraft is achieved by class and
type definitions. "Class" of an aircraft means "a classification of
aircraft within a category having similar operating characteris-
tics."" 7 "Type" definitions, "[a]s used with respect to the certifi-
1,' See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 23 (airworthiness standards for normal, utility, and
acrobatic category airplanes); id. pt. 25 (airworthiness standards for transport cat-
egory airplanes); id. pt. 27 (airworthiness standards for normal category rotor-
craft); id. pt. 29 (airworthiness standards for transport category rotorcraft).
14 Id. § 1.1.
"Category": (1) As used with respect to the certification, ratings,
privileges, and limitations of airmen, means a broad classification
of aircraft. Examples include: airplane; rotorcraft; glider; and
lighter-than-air; and (2) As used with respect to the certification of
aircraft, means a grouping of aircraft based upon intended use or
operating limitations. Examples include: transport, normal, utility,
acrobatic, limited, restricted, and provisional.
Id.
15 Id. "'Lighter-than-air aircraft' means aircraft that can rise and remain sus-
pended by using contained gas weighing less than the air that is displaced by the
gas." Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. (emphasis added). "Examples include: single engine; multiengine;
land; water; gyroplane; helicopter; airship; and free balloon . . . having similar
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cation, ratings, privileges, and limitations of airmen, means a
specific make and basic model of aircraft, including modifica-
tions thereto that do not change its handling or flight character-
istics.""8  An additional definition frequently used in the
regulations is "large aircraft," which "means aircraft of more
than 12,500 pounds, maximum certificated takeoff weight."1 9
B. FAA STATUTORY/REGULATORY AUTHORITY OVERVIEW
1. Federal Regulation over Aircraft and Aeronautics Generally
The FAA regulates the design, testing, production, operation,
and maintenance of civil aircraft in the United States. 20 FAA
regulations apply to nearly all aircraft including one-of-a-kind
prototype aircraft that must receive special "experimental" certi-
fication before they can be legally flown. 2'
At one time, the rules and regulations governing the opera-
tion of aircraft were rather simple. The 1920 federal regulations
for operating aircraft contained only twenty-five one-sentence
commandments. The first of these stated: "Don't take the
machine into the air unless you are satisfied. it will fly.",22 Today,
however, the rules and regulations pertaining to aircraft are ex-
tensive and address most aspects of aircraft design, manufactur-
ing, and operation. The roots of modern aviation regulation
started with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) which was cre-
ated by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.2
The charter of the regulatory system under the 1938 Act "was
very vague ... [including] 'encouragement and development of
an air transportation system properly adapted to ... present and
characteristics of propulsion, flight, or landing. Examples include: airplane; ...
landplane; and seaplane." Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 One type of aircraft exempt from registration and certification require-
ments are "ultralight" models.
21 See 14 C.F.R. § 21.191 (experimental certificates).
22 Regulations for Operation of Aircraft, Commencing 1920, reprinted in course
outline for Air Law I, by Robert A. Gwinn (1989) (on file at the Underwood Law
Library, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex.).
23 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw § 1.3, at 1-11 (2d ed. 1981). Origi-
nally, the CAB was called the Civil Aeronautics Authority. Id. The CAB was incor-
porated into the Bureau of Air Commerce and the Bureau of Air Mail. 1 PAUL S.
DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW AND REGULATION § 1.03, at 1-7 (1992). The Act of
1938 superseded the first basic federal aviation statute which was the Air Com-
merce Act of 1926. The Act of 1926 placed responsibility for the regulation of air
commerce on the Secretary of Commerce.
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future needs.' '2 4 Even though the charter was vague, the CAB
nevertheless exercised broad regulatory power over most aspects
of aviation under this grant. The CAB regulation of aviation
continued until the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 created the
FAA. 25 Among other changes, the 1958 Act reallocated respon-
sibility for air navigation and safety to the newly formed FAA
while retaining in the CAB responsibility for the economic regu-
lation of airlines.2 6 Later, accident investigation and recommen-
dation authorities held by the CAB were transferred to the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) .27 The NTSB was
made an independent organization in 1974 by the Transporta-
tion Safety Act of 1974.28 An interesting aspect of the division of
power and responsibilities between the NTSB and the FAA is
that the NTSB investigates accidents and makes recommenda-
tions, but these recommendations do not have the force of
law.2
9
2. Development of Modern Federal Regulation over Aircraft and
Aeronautics
The FAA exercises regulatory authority over aircraft designs
under statutory grant of power to the Department of Transpor-
tation.3 0 The statute provides that "[t]he Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration shall promote safe flight of civil
aircraft in air commerce by prescribing-(1) minimum stan-
dards required in the interest of safety for appliances and for
24 LOWENFELD, supra note 23, § 1.4, at 1-13 (quoting § 102 of the 1938 Act).
This same language was later retained when the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was
adopted.
25 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, repealed by
Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379, 1383 (1994) [hereinafter Act of
1958]. Originally the FAA was in the Department of Commerce, but was later
moved to the Department of Transportation. 1 DEMPSEY ET AL., supra note 23,
§ 1.04, at 1-10.
26 1 DEMPSEY ET AL., supra note 23, § 1.04, at 1-10.
27 Id. § 3.08, at 3-7.
28 Id. at 3-7 to 3-8; see also Transportation Safety Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
633, 88 Stat. 2167, repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379, 1388
(1994).
29 1 DEMPSEY ET AL., supra note 23, § 3.08, at 3-8. The NTSB investigates acci-
dents and recommends to the FAA that an SCR be commenced. See infra note
149 and accompanying text (example of this procedure). This procedural ap-
proach results from the division of power.
so 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (1994).
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the design, material, construction, quality of work, and perform-
ance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers. "31
The FAA, and the power delegated to it, were created by the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958.32 The background leading to the
Act of 1958 is reviewed in House Report 2360 on the proposed
bill.33 In reviewing the legislative intent behind the Act of 1958,
two points are emphasized: (1) the legislative rationale for regu-
lating both air traffic and aircraft design safety; and (2) the si-
multaneous goals of the legislation in both the Act of 1938 and
the Act of 1958 of seeking safety while still promoting civil avia-
tion. The original legislative motivation leading to the Act of
1958 is emphasized in House Report 2360 on the bill as
"[a] irspace use and air-safety problems" that came "first to gen-
eral public notice, perhaps, as a result of the midair collision of
two airliners over the Grand Canyon on June 30, 1956, when
128 lives were lost."34 Safety in aircraft design, however, was not
principally discussed. In 1955 the President appointed a group
known as the Harding Committee 35 to "study the nature and se-
riousness of the air traffic control problem, ' 36 and in 1958 the
President recommended creation of an independent aviation
agency.37 While the federal studies were largely instigated by air
traffic control concerns, aircraft safety, as related to licensing
and certification, was added to the responsibilities of the pro-
posed new agency when the bill was created. The legislative lan-
guage makes clear that aviation safety was the paramount
31 Id. § 44701 (a).
32 Act of 1958, supra note 25.
3 H.R. REp. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741.
34 Id., 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3742.
35 The committee was formed under the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at
the request of the President, and was officially known as the Aviation Facilities
Study Group. Id.
36 Id.
37 In that message, the President said:
Recent midair collisions of aircraft, occasioning tragic losses of
human life, have emphasized the need for a system of air traffic
management which will prevent, within the limits of human ingenuity,
a recurrence of such accidents.
In this message, accordingly, I am recommending to the Con-
gress the establishment of an aviation organization in which would
be consolidated among other things all the essential management
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concern and that a comprehensive framework of air traffic con-
trol and aircraft safety regulations was the intended solution .3
Just as control over air traffic and aircraft design was envi-
sioned to work hand-in-hand to achieve safety, House Report
2360 indicates that there were in fact the simultaneous goals of
seeking a high degree of safety while encouraging civil aviation
generally. House Report 2360 indicates that the "purpose of
th [e] legislation" was, in part, "advancement and promotion of
civil aeronautics generally, including the promulgation and en-
forcement of safety regulations," 9 and to do so "in such manner
as to best foster its development and safety. '40 This is consistent
with the legislative position taken twenty years earlier in the
grant of power to the CAB under the 1938 Act. That Act stated
that its purpose was the "encouragement" of aviation.4" The Act
of 1958 conference report makes clear that no matter the choice
of word, "promotion" or "encouragement," the legislators in-
tended the same effect.42 It is significant that aircraft safety and
"advancement," "encouragement," and "foster[ing] [civil avia-
38 See id.
39 Id., 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3741 (emphasis added).
40 Id.
41 Civil Aeronautice Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 2, 52 Stat. 973, 980.
42 H.R. CON. REP. No. 2556, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3767, 3771. In regard to the 1938 Act, the 1958 Act "is a reenact-
ment of existing law without substantial change." H.R. REP. No. 2360, supra note
33, 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3756. While the legislative comment indicates that no
substantive change to the 1938 Act was intended, one official expressed concern
that the new framework would vest economic and safety responsibilities in sepa-
rate organizations-the CAB and the FAA, respectively-and that such action
would have the unintended effect of changing the law. Letter from James R.
Durfee, Chairman, Dept. of Commerce, Civil Aeronautics Admin., to Rep. Oren
Harris, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Commerce (July 29, 1958), reproduced
in H.R. REP. No. 2360, supra note 33, 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3763 [hereinafter
Durfee letter]. Mr. Durfee's concern was that the separation of these two func-
tions would frustrate the intent of the Act of 1958-that aviation be both en-
couraged and safety promoted. In his letter, Mr. Durfee states:
[Separation of the two functions] repudiates the congressional in-
tent expressed in the civil aeronautics act [of 1938] that there
should be a balancing of the safety and economic considerations in
the field of safety rulemaking. In adopting the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938, this was a basic concept which Congress spelled out in sec-
tion 2. It was the specific intent of Congress that the board con-
sider the economic consequences of each safety regulation which it
promulgates. It is obvious that standards could be established
which would further enhance safety but at a price that few could
afford to fly.
600
FAA SPECIAL CERTIFICATION REVIEW
tion's] development" are stated on equal terms.4" This point is
emphasized to make clear that part of the legislative intent in
both the 1938 Act and 1958 Act was that regulations be promul-
gated only after balancing the safety and advancement objec-
tives. The legislative intent that aviation safely flourish under a
comprehensive framework of FAA regulations will be reconsidered
later in this Comment in the federal preemption analysis. The
questions there, of course, are whether the intended balancing
can be accomplished if the safety and advancement functions
exist in separate government agencies, and whether state legisla-
tures and state courts are allowed to rule on matters related to
aircraft design.
C. FAA REGULATIONS AND CERTIFICATIONS TODAY
1. Introduction
Under the present statutory grant, regulation of aviation is ex-
tensive-one might say pervasive. While some of the various avi-
ation regulations will be addressed in additional detail later, a
quick overview is provided in this section. First, in order to le-
gally operate the aircraft, the pilot will be licensed (called a pilot
certificate) and may also have various "ratings" that authorize
such things as instrument operation and operation of general
category and class of aircraft such as an airplane, single-engine,
or seaplane.44 Additionally, depending on the type of aircraft,
the pilot may also have a special "type" rating that is aircraft
model specific, which is required for piloting large or complex
aircraft.4 5 In addition to a pilot certificate, the pilot will also
have a medical certificate46 and will have met certain recency of
experience requirements. 7 The pilot will be charting the air-
craft course based on airspace use regulations, visibility, and
weather, all of which are addressed in various regulations.4"
In addition to the pilot, the aircraft, its manufacturers, own-
ers, and operators will also have passed a number of regulatory
hurdles. Any new aircraft design, prior to eligibility for produc-
43 See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
44 See 14 C.F.R. § 61.5 (1996).
45 Id.
46 Pilot medical certificate requirements are set out in 14 C.F.R. pt. 67.
47 See generally 14 C.F.R. § 61.57 ("Recent Flight Experience: Pilot in
Command").
48 See generally id. pt. 91 ("General Operating and Flight Rules"); id. § 91.155
("Basic [Visual Flight Rules] VFR weather minimums").
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tion, must first gain a "type certification" (TC).' 9 A manufac-
turer who desires to build the specific model of aircraft must
obtain a "production certificate" (PC),50 and each individual air-
craft made must obtain an "airworthiness certificate."5" The air-
craft may also have been modified from the original design, for
instance adding long-range fuel tanks, in which case a "supple-
mental type certification" (STC) 52 is required, and installed
equipment may be governed by a "technical standard order"
(TSO) .A
Even if the aircraft, and its installed equipment, met every reg-
ulatory hurdle when it was produced, the FAA prescribes ongo-
ing regulations, inspections, and other oversight mechanisms to
assure continuing safety and compliance. The following sec-
tions will go through these initial and ongoing certification steps
in more detail, but the point to note here is that the overall
regulatory process is comprehensive and spans from the original
aircraft design, to the manufacturing, to the maintenance of
each aircraft, and finally to the ongoing certification of a model.
2. Certification of Aircraft Designs
A TC of a new aircraft design is required to insure that all
characteristics meet FAA safety requirements. For each category
of aircraft, the FAA has regulations that define allowable physi-
4 See generally 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a) (1994) (definition of type certificates and
their significance).
50 See generally id. § 44704(b) (definition of production certificates and their
significance).
51 See generally id. § 44704(c) (definition of airworthiness certificates and their
significance).
52 An STC is required for any aircraft alteration that introduces "a major
change in type design, not great enough to require a new application for a type
certificate." 14 C.F.R. § 21.113. Examples of common modifications requiring
an STC would include additional fuel tanks, speed brakes, speed modifications,
and engine substitutions, although even less significant modifications may also
require an STC.
53 A TSO "is a minimum performance standard for specified articles.., used
on civil aircraft." Id. § 21.601. To manufacture TSO related items, manufactur-
ers must have approved quality control and record keeping systems in place. Id.
§§ 21.607, 21.613. An example of a TSO item is a Global Positioning System
(GPS) unit that is specifically approved for instrument (IFR) flight navigation.
To obtain TSO certification, the manufacturer must prove that the GPS "per-
forms up to IFR standards." Unicorn, FLYING, Nov. 1995, at 50. Also, a GPS manu-
facturer would obtain an STC that demonstrates that the GPS operates properly
when installed in a specific aircraft. As summarized in a recent article, "A TSO is
a laboratory type test of performance and durability to show a device is of aircraft
quality, while the STC checks operation of the device in an actual aircraft." Id.
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cal and flight characteristics for certification. To illustrate, most
small aircraft are certified under Part 23 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs).1 4 Part 23 "prescribes airworthiness stan-
dards for the issue of type certificates, and changes to those cer-
tificates, for airplanes in the normal, utility, acrobatic, and
commuter categories. ' 55 Part 23 prescribes such constraints as
maximum landing configuration stalling speed-single engine
and light twin-engine aircraft must have a stalling speed of sixty-
one knots or less56 -and maximum control forces-roll control
force can not exceed seventy-five pounds for temporary applica-
tion and ten pounds for prolonged application.57 Some of the
requirements seem extremely obscure. One section provides a
test for determining ground loads for skiplanes (ski-equipped
planes intended to land on snow).58 That section describes the
certification requirement by saying: "[A]ssuming that the air-
plane is resting on the ground with one main ski frozen at rest
and the other skis free to slide, a limit side force equal to 0.036
times the design maximum weight must be applied near the tail
assembly, with a factor of safety of 1."" In all, the certification
requirements under Part 23 dictate over 360 areas for test, verifi-
cation, and inspection, with each area often having numerous
specific tests.60 A sample of the topics addressed in Part 23 in-
cludes: load distribution, weight and balance, propellers, pro-
peller pitch, flight performance, stall speed, takeoff speed,
minimum flight speed fifty feet AGL after takeoff, minimum an-
gle of climb capability, minimum climb speed at minimum an-
gle of climb, single engine performance for climb, cruise,
descent and landing, landing distance, balked landing climb
performance, flight controllability and maneuverability, critical
engine inoperative stalls, longitudinal stability and control, vi-
bration and buffeting, high speed characteristics, flight envel-
ope, design airspeeds, limit maneuvering load factors, and
unsymmetrical flight conditions. 61 This lengthy-but far from
exhaustive-list is provided to emphasize the comprehensive
54 14 C.F.R. §§ 23.1-.1589, app. A-I (known as "Part 23").
55 Id. § 23.1.
56 Id. § 23.49.
57 Id. § 23.143.
58 Id. § 23.505.
59 Id.
60 See generally id. pt. 23.
61 Id.
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scope of the certification test procedures. 62 The detailed certifi-
cation procedures seem to produce two chief results. First, air-
craft certification is a long, difficult and expensive process.
Second, aircraft that are certified have been very closely ana-
lyzed before they are produced and flown. In discussing the
cost of design certification, a build-it-yourself aircraft kit com-
pany representative commented that if they could afford to ob-
tain FAA approval for their four-seat kit-built aircraft, the
production price might "approach $100,000-nearly four times
the basic kit cost. '63
3. Aircraft Production Certification
Once an aircraft design has been tested, verified, and received
FAA type certification, additional certification is required for a
manufacturer to produce and sell that aircraft. To obtain a
"production certificate" (PC), an applicant must hold, or have
rights to, a type certificate (TC) or supplemental type certificate
(STC) .64 A significant aspect of the production certificate pro-
cess is that the holder must develop, have certified, and main-
tain a rigorous quality control system.65  The holder is
responsible for making sure that "each part and each completed
product... conforms to the approved design and is in a condi-
tion for safe operation. '66 The primary privileges of a produc-
tion certificate are that the holder can "[o]btain an aircraft
airworthiness certificate without further showing" and may con-
duct training for maintenance, inspection, and operation of the
aircraft model .6  The ability to obtain an airworthiness certifi-
62 Since hundreds of detailed engineering reports are required to comply with
the certification procedures, the FAA uses two administrative procedures to dele-
gate much of the responsibility in certification: the designated engineering rep-
resentative (DER) procedure and the delegation of authority (DOA) procedure.
Under these procedures, the FAA observes major tests and reviews key docu-
ments. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN. TRANSP. SYS. CTR., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TASK
FORCE REPORT V-TAIL BONANZA INVESTIGATION 11 (1986) [hereinafter BONANZA
SCR REPORT].
63 Edward H. Phillips, Aerospace Perspectives Kit-Built Aircraft Fuel Renaissance in
Industry Dominated by Old Designs, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 18, 1989, at
93.
64 14 C.F.R. § 21.133; see also supra note 52 (discussion of STC).
65 14 C.F.R. § 21.139. "The applicant must show that he has established and
can maintain a quality control system for any product, for which he requests a
production certificate, so that each article will meet the design provisions of the
pertinent type certificate." Id.
66 Id. § 21.165.
67 Id. § 21.163.
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cate without further showing is key for a manufacturer, because
an airworthiness certificate is required before an aircraft can be
legally operated.6 8
4. Airworthiness and Registration
The preceding discussions on type certification and produc-
tion certification address requirements for the design of a par-
ticular model or type of aircraft. In addition to the regulations
that oversee the basic model, there are additional regulations
that address the safety of each individual aircraft. Each aircraft
must be both certified airworthy and registered. Issuance of air-
craft registration "is not a function of airworthiness certification;
however, U.S. registration is a prerequisite for issuance of an
airworthiness certificate."69 Before an aircraft can legally be op-
erated, an appropriate airworthiness certificate must be issued.
FAR section 21.183 prescribes the basic requirements for issu-
ance of standard airworthiness certificates for aircraft manufac-
tured under a PC or TC.70 A standard airworthiness certificate
remains valid as long as maintenance, preventive maintenance,
and alterations are performed in accordance with FAR Parts 43
and 91.71 "Section 41.13 of the FAR requires aircraft to be main-
tained in accordance with its approved type design. "72
5. Post-Certification Regulations
Although an aircraft may be registered, its design fully certi-
fied, and the aircraft operational in all respects, ongoing main-
tenance and inspections are necessary to keep the aircraft safe
(and legal) to fly. Furthermore, the FAA may impose new air-
worthiness requirements at any time, retroactively forcing in-
spection, maintenance, or upgrade on an aircraft in order to
keep it flying.
a. Inspections
All aircraft must receive (at least) annual inspections by a cer-
tified mechanic. Details of the inspection must be entered in an
official maintenance logbook. Aircraft operated for hire, or
68 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
69 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICA-
TION OF AIRCRAFT AND RELATED PRODUCTS 8 (1994).
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used to give flight instruction, must receive a 100-hour inspec-
tion.73 The purpose of the inspection is to determine whether
the aircraft and all its parts meet "all applicable airworthiness
requirements."74 The annual inspection is comprehensive and
addresses all areas of the aircraft including, but not limited to,
airframe, flight control systems, engine, fuel and oil systems, avi-
onics, wheels, brakes, windows, controls, hoses, linkages, acces-
sories, and wiring.75 In general, all aspects of the aircraft must
"pass" the inspection for it to continue flying. Any finding of a
nonairworthy condition would ground the aircraft until
repaired.
b. Airworthiness Directives
While each aircraft is individually inspected for general air-
worthiness on an annual basis, the FAA can also issue airworthi-
ness directives (ADs) which dictate mandatory actions,
inspections, or maintenance on aircraft.7 6 ADs are issued when
unsafe conditions are found in an aircraft, aircraft engine, pro-
peller, system or aircraft appliances, or when the FAA deter-
mines that a similar unsafe condition "is likely to exist or
develop in other products of the same type design."7 7 ADs are
mandatory7" and may "prescrib[e] inspections and the condi-
tions and limitations, if any, under which those [aircraft] may
continue to be operated. '7 9 An AD may ground an aircraft until
a specified inspection is performed, may require that an inspec-
tion be performed within a specified number of operating
hours, or may dictate that a specific maintenance task be accom-
plished. Examples of recent ADs issued for small aircraft in-
clude one requiring inspection of wing attached bolts on
Grumman "Tigers" (AA-5 series) and another requiring repeti-
tive inspections of the main landing gear on Piper PA-24, -28, -
30, -32, -34, and -39 series aircraft.80 Both ADs require compli-
73 14 C.F.R. § 91.409. There are some exceptions and variations on the annual
inspection for experimental aircraft and for aircraft (mostly commercial) which
are periodically inspected as part of a regular inspection program. Id.
74 Id. § 43.15.
75 See generally id. pt. 43, app. D (detailing the items included in annual and
100-hour inspections).
76 Id. § 39.1.
77 Id.
78 Id. § 39.3.
79 Id. § 39.11.
80 Squawk Sheet, AOPA PILOT, Dec. 1995, at 34.
606
FAA SPECIAL CERTIFICATION REVIEW
ance within one hundred operating hours from the AD effective
date.8
c. NTSB Recommendations
The NTSB, as the result of their investigations, can make
safety recommendations to the FAA. While the NTSB recom-
mendations do not by themselves have the force of law, the FAA
can act on the NTSB's recommendations, thus, providing such
authority.8 2
d. Special Certification Reviews
In exceptional circumstances, the FAA can question the certi-
fication of a design and require that tests and analysis of the sort
originally required to obtain a type certificate be repeated. A
detailed look at that process follows in the next section.
D. SPECIAL CERTIFICATION REVIEW
As indicated above, one of the post-certification measures that
may be invoked by the FAA is the SCR. The FAA has an express
statutory power to reinspect, reexamine, suspend, or revoke any
certificate, including a type certificate or production certificate,
where "safety ... and the public interest require that action."83
According to the FAA, "An SCR is an in-depth comprehensive
81 Id.
82 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship be-
tween the FAA and the NTSB).
83 49 U.S.C. § 44709 (1994). The relevant statute provides:
(a) Reinspection and reexamination.-The Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration may reinspect at any time a civil
aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, air navigation facility,
or air agency, or reexamine an airman holding a certificate issued
under section 44703 of this tile.
(b) Actions of the Administrator.-The Administrator may issue
an order amending, modifying, suspending, or revoking-
(1) any part of a certificate issued under this chapter if-
(A) the Administrator decides after conducting a reinspection,
reexamination, or other investigation that safety in air commerce
or air transportation and the public interest require that action....
Id.
This section was recently updated and recodified from various sections now
repealed. Section 44709(b) (1) which refers to "a certificate" should be read as
including "type certificate, production certificate, airworthiness certificate, air-
man certificate, air carrier operating certificate, air navigation facility certificate
(including airport operating certificate), or air agency certificate" as previously
provided for in various sections of 49 U.S.C. [now repealed]. Id.
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review of complex, controversial, or potential unsafe aircraft de-
sign features, or aircraft component problems associated with
airworthiness determinations."84 In the course of the SCR,
"[e]very significant aspect and ramification of the potential safety
problem in question should be fully explored."'85 The FAA further
makes clear that the SCR is applied as an ongoing safety scheme
after a design has already fully met certification requirements.
"[The SCR] is a means of evaluating past type certification pro-
grams or potential unsafe design features on previously approved
products."86 The SCR can be an extensive investigation whose
scope can match that of the original certification procedure.
The results of an SCR include the following: (1) a detailed re-
view and evaluation of the product's (aircraft's) pertinent air-
worthiness and operational certification requirements; (2)
recommendations for revisions of the aircraft's airworthiness
and operational certification requirements, if appropriate; and
(3) improvement in effecting uniform application of the certifi-
cation rules throughout the FAA.87 The SCR activity is initiated
in the FAA center responsible for certification of the aircraft de-
sign," and an SCR team is established for the investigation.89
Depending on the circumstances, during the course of an SCR
the subject aircraft may be grounded or have its operations lim-
134 Federal Aviation Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Order No. 8110.4A, at 41
(1995) [hereinafter FAA Order No. 8110.4A].
85 Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
86 Id. at 41 (emphasis added). The FAA offers the following guidelines for
when, and under what circumstances, an SCR is warranted:
(b) Potential safety problem areas for which an SCR may be ap-
propriate include:
1 Complex or unique design features;
2 Advanced state-of-the-art concepts in design and
manufacturing;
3 Potential unsafe features used on similar previous designs re-
quiring further analysis and evaluation;
4 Compliance areas critical to safety and operational suitability
which require evaluations;
5 Unsafe operational or maintainability characteristics;
6 Equivalent level of safety determinations with potential major
effects on safety; and
7 Complicated interrelationships of unusual features.
Id.
87 Id. at 42.
88 The FAA has multiple certification centers each of which have responsibility
for different types of aircraft designs. For instance, small aircraft are certified out
of the Small Aircraft Directorate in Kansas City, Missouri; rotorcraft are certified
out of the Rotorcraft Directorate in Fort Worth, Texas.
89 FAA Order No. 8110.4A, supra note 84, at 42.
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ited.9° Following the SCR investigations, the SCR team prepares
a report containing the various findings and recommendations.
It is the responsibility of the certification directorate to act on
these recommendations to the extent deemed appropriate. 9'
Further discussion of the SCR is provided later in this Comment
under the application of the SCR process to specific aircraft
designs.
E. FAA REGULATIONS SUMMARY
1. Conclusions as to Federal Statutony/Regulatory Oversight of
Aircraft Design
In the preceding sections, the extent and scope of FAA regu-
lation of aircraft design has been reviewed in some detail. While
this Comment is not intended to be a treatise on FAA regulation
of aircraft design, such a detailed review is necessary to clearly
portray the overall scheme of the regulations and to illustrate
their extensive nature.
Although the statutory grant of power is rather general, the
FAA regulations are extensive and exhaustively address each
phase of aircraft design, manufacture, and operation. Of partic-
ular interest is the process of continuous monitoring of both
aircraft designs and of individual aircraft.92 Even where a design
is certified under all applicable regulations, any new informa-
tion or improvement in technology that brings safety into ques-
tion can immediately be acted upon under existing regulations.
2. Impact of Recent Revisions/Recodification of Title 49 of the
United States Code
In 1994, in a couple of bills, Congress significantly revised,
restated, and recodified Title 49 of the United States Code. 93
90 Edward H. Phillips, NTSB Studies Jetstream Crash, ATR Icing Data, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 2, 1995, at 30. For example, following the American
Eagle flight 4184 crash on October 31, 1994, the FAA banned ATR 42 and ATR
72 aircraft from flying in known or forecasted icing conditions. Id.; see also supra
note 8 and accompanying text.
91 FAA Order No. 8110.4A, supra note 84, at 42.
92 As discussed in supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text, each model of
aircraft can be the subject of ADs, NTSB recommendations, and SCRs that assure
that unsafe aspects of a design, if discovered, can be corrected. Similarly, the
annual and other repetitive inspections required for an airworthiness certificate
assure that each individual aircraft is being maintained in safe condition.
93 Act ofJuly 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745; Act of Oct. 31, 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-429, 108 Stat. 4377.
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With decades of judicial interpretation of the prior code ad-
dressing significant aviation questions, an important issue now is
whether the 1994 code revisions altered the rules of law pertain-
ing to aviation. While much of the code language has been sig-
nificantly altered, the legislative intent, however, is stated in the
bill as "restat[ing] in comprehensive form, without substantive
change, certain general and permanent laws related to transpor-
tation ... [and] to make other technical improvements in the
Code."94 An example of the type of changes made is described
as "simple language has been substituted for awkward and obso-
lete terms."9 This language says that the changes were not in-
tended to impact the application or interpretation of the
aviation statutes and, therefore, should not be used to justify
new interpretations of aviation law in settled areas.




As discussed in the preceding sections, the SCR plays an im-
portant role in policing the safety of aircraft design once that
design has been certified by the FAA. This section provides a
detailed look at two aircraft designs that have been subjected to
an SCR. Some background on the aircraft, its design history,
and accident statistics are included to provide a framework
against which the FAA SCR action can be viewed. Both aircraft
described here are small aircraft, chosen, in part, because their
structure and systems are more understandable. One is a pis-
ton-powered, single-engine design-the Beechcraft "V-tail" Bo-
nanza; the other is a turboprop, twin-engine design-the
Mitsubishi MU-2.
B. BEECHCRAFT V35 "V-TAIL" BONANZA
1. The Beechcraft Bonanza
The ubiquitous Beechcraft "V-tail" Bonanza96 is one of the
more recognizable small aircraft on the airport ramp, character-
94 H.R. REP. No. 180, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 818, 818 (emphasis added).
95 H.R. REP. No. 831, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3579, 3579.
96 "The Beechcraft V35, V35A and V35B Bonanzas are four- or six-place all-
metal, low-wing, single-engine airplanes with fully retractable tricycle landing
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ized by the unusual "V"-shaped tail with no vertical rudder. 7
The Bonanza is also noteworthy for its long-lived production.9 8
The first production started in 1946 and continued with some
modifications through 1982. 99 Today, with the oldest Bonanza
almost 50 years old, over 6000 of the more than 10,000 Bonan-
zas made are still flying.100 In pilot circles, the Bonanza has long
enjoyed a reputation as one of the premier small aircraft. In
spite of its popularity and long production, several years ago the
V-tail came under FAA scrutiny when the strength of the aircraft
was questioned. Ultimately, the FAA instituted an SCR of the
Bonanza analyzing the tail in particular. 10 1
2. Bonanza Accident History
Prior to discussing the FAA review, this Comment will present
a brief review of small aircraft accident statistics from approxi-
mately 1979. Much of the accident statistical data and conclu-
gear." PILOTS OPERATING HANDBOOK AND FAA APPROVED AIRPLANE FLIGHT MAN-
UAL FOR THE BEECHCRAFT V35, V35A AND V35B 7-5 (Beech Aircraft Corp. 1982)
[hereinafter BONANZA OPERATING HANDBOOK]. The aircraft is manufactured by
Beech Aircraft Corp., Wichita, Kansas, which is now a subsidiary of Raytheon,
Corp. The V35 was first flown in 1945, and mass production ended in 1985 after
10,390 were produced. JANE'S, supra note 8, at 338.
Bonanza characteristics include the following:
Length 26 feet 5 inches
Wingspan 33 feet 6 inches
Height 7 feet 7 inches
Max Take-off Weight 3400 pounds
FAA approved in normal and utility category,
certified under FAR Part 23.
BONANZA OPERATING HANDBOOK, supra, at 1-9, 1-12.
97 According to Beech, "The Bonanza has 'Vee' tail control surfaces which are
arranged to act as both elevator and rudder. The two surfaces work together for
elevator action and opposite each other in rudder action. The 'Vee' tail operates
like a conventional tail in response to elevator and rudder control action." BO-
NANZA OPERATING HANDBOOK, supra note 96, at 7-5.
98 See Used Airplane Report: 285hp V-Tails, FLYING, Nov. 1995, at 78-80 [hereinaf-
ter Used V-Tails]. The Bonanza is also known as the model of aircraft which
crashed on February 3, 1959, killing singer Buddy Holly. The cause of that acci-
dent, however, is considered to be weather related. Unicom, FLYING, Mar. 1996, at
111.
% Used V-Tails, supra note 98, at 78-80. Another source states that the Bonanza
was introduced in 1947, not 1946. BONANZA SCR REPORT, supra note 62, at 1.
100 Used V-Tails, supra note 98, at 79.
101 Id.
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sions are from a 1979 study by the NTSB. 11 2 This report was
published just three years before the end of V-tail Bonanza pro-
duction, and, at the time the study started, the V-tail had been in
production for twenty-six years.10 3 The FAA study focused on
thirty-three makes and models of aircraft (including the Beech
33, 35, and 36 Bonanzas) which together accounted for 89.3%
of the hours flown by the active single-engine fleet during the
study period.10 4 Of the thirty-three aircraft models studied, the
Beech 33, 35, and 36 family'0 5 had the lowest overall accident inci-
dent rate per 100,000 hours flown-8.73 per 100,000 hours.1' 6
The venerable Piper J-3 "Cub" accident incident rate, for com-
parison, was 26.97 per 100,000 hours flown.1 07 One startling sta-
tistic is that in the more than 11,000 accidents tabulated, 185
were airframe failures, and of those 185, 40 were in the Bonanza
family. The next closest was the Piper PA-28 (Warrior) with
twenty-eight airframe failures. Only four of the thirty-three de-
signs reviewed had double-digit incidences of airframe failure.10 8
At the end of the FAA report, the authors noted, "It is signifi-
cant that all 40 of the in-flight airframe failures of the Beech 33,
35, and 36 involved the V-tailed models (Beech 35). Obviously
attention should be focused on this model."109
The conclusions that can be drawn from this data, however,
are mixed. As the FAA noted, "Numerous highly interrelated
variables are involved in these accidents including the pilot, the
manner in which he operates the aircraft, the weather and ter-
rain in which and over which the aircraft is flown, the type of
flying, maintenance of the aircraft, the aircraft design, and the
manufacturing process.""10  Beech Aircraft Company has
stressed that all aircraft are vulnerable to excessive speed build
102 NATIONAL TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SPECIAL STUDY, NTSB-AAS-79-1, SINGLE-EN-
GINE, FIXED-WING GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS 1972-1976 (1979) [hereinafter
NTSB-AAS-79-1].
103 See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing Bonanza production
history).
104 NTSB-AAS-79-1, supra note 102, at 10. This study was limited to light air-
craft, which are defined as those weighing less than 12,500 pounds. Id. at 1.
105 The Beech 36 is also a "Bonanza," but has a conventional tail with separate
elevators and rudder.
106 NTSB-AAS-79-1, supra note 102, at 15.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 25.
109 Id. at 55 (pointing out that none of the 40 Bonanza airframe failures oc-
curred in the Beech 36 conventional tail Bonanza).
I10 Id. at 2.
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up which can result from a situation where the pilot becomes
disoriented such as during severe turbulence. 1 1'
3. FAA Special Certification Review of the Bonanza
In 1984 the President of the American Bonanza Society wrote
to the FAA and requested that the FAA conduct an investigation
into the V-tail to address the ongoing debate regarding the
safety of the design in light of the seemingly disproportionately
high rate of in-flight structural failures.112 The FAA immediately
responded to the request and instituted actions to perform a
study that "would produce conclusive data that either proves or




The technical details of the Bonanza SCR 114 investigation are
quite interesting from both engineering and legal perspectives.
From a legal perspective, it is not the technical details that are
important but rather the scope, detail, and thoroughness of the
investigation; the conclusions and actions that resulted from the
investigation; and the role the SCR plays in the overall safety
process-only part of which is the initial design certification.
111 BONANZA OPERATING HANDBOOK, supra note 96, at 3-14. Additionally, in the
safety information section, Beech adds:
The result of vertigo is loss of control of the airplane. If the loss of
control is sustained it will result in an excessive speed accident. Ex-
cessive speed accidents occur in one of two manners, either as an
inflight airframe separation or as a high speed ground impact; and
they are fatal accidents in either case. All airplanes are subject to this
form of accident.
Id. at 10-37 (emphasis added).
112 BONANZA SCR REPORT, supra note 62, at 1. The American Bonanza Society
requested a study to "determine conclusively that there are or that there are not
deficiencies inherent in the design of the Beechcraft V-tail Bonanza that contrib-
ute significantly to in-flight airframe failures." Id. at xi. The American Bonanza
Society is a private organization of Bonanza owners and enthusiasts. At the time
the Bonanza SCR Report was written, the Bonanza Society had about 7000 active
members. Id. at 1.
113 Id. at 1. The FAA Administrator assigned responsibility to the FAA Central
Region for this study, and the Central Region engaged the Department of Trans-
portation, Transportation Systems Center (TSC), in Cambridge, Mass., to per-
form the engineering analysis and testing. Id.
114 While every report and article on the Bonanza refers to the study as a "Spe-
cial Certification Review," a letter from the FAA "Central Region" (now called the
Small Airplane Directorate) said that the 'V-tail Bonanza investigation wasn't an
official SCR but it was handled like an SCR. It was not done by the usual FAA
certification personnel but was done by FAA contract to the Transportation Sys-
tems Center." Letter from Robert W. Alpiser, FAA official at the Small Airplane
Directorate, to Thom Tarnay (Nov. 6, 1995) (on file with the Journal of Air Law
and Commerce).
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To illustrate these points, the following provides some detail
about the SCR investigation.
The Bonanza SCR investigation was performed by the Depart-
ment of Transportation, Transportation Systems Center in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts."x5  The study was performed by
government personnel with both contract support from industry
and universities as well as extensive help from other government
agencies, industry, and academia. 1 6 Task force members in-
cluded distinguished scientists including several university
professors from leading schools. 17
The task force conducted an intensive six-month study with
two main thrusts. The first consisted of a detailed analysis of
Bonanza accident records for "a better understanding of the fac-
tors contributing to in-flight structural accidents;"" 8 the second
focused on a review of the Bonanza certification history includ-
ing a detailed review of structural analyses and tests that had
been conducted by the manufacturer. 119
The structural analyses and tests were intended to ascertain
whether the aircraft, and in particular the V-tail structure, could
be expected to survive the most severe flight loads that the air-
plane could encounter including extreme maneuvers and gust
encounters during flight. 120
The task force also reviewed the strength of the tail, wing, and
empennage. As the task force report makes clear, this is an ex-
tremely complicated issue because "[d] esign for airframe struc-
tural integrity is not an exact science. "121 The design must
comprehend not only the loads encountered in straight and
level flight, but much more complicated situations such as gust
response, loads during dive or flare, complicated loads during
slip or stall, and other transient conditions. The task force re-
viewed all strength tests and calculations against the certification
requirements and found that the Bonanza met those require-
ments within the approved flight envelope. This analysis was
very involved and the engineering summary of those tests cover
over forty pages in the task force report. 2 2 In summarizing
115 BONANZA SCR REPORT, supra note 62, at iii.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 111-14.
118 Id. at xi.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 22-23.
121 Id. at 17.
122 Id. at 17-60.
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their finding about the V-tail, the task force concluded that due
to the nonconventional configuration, the certification require-
ments may not provide the same safety margin as for a conven-
tional tail. 2 ' The report also observed that "[t]here exist
maneuvers, which, when executed at, or even below, the maneu-
ver speed, can produce loads exceeding the limit load of the
tail. . . . Such maneuvers are unlikely under normal circum-
stances, but inadvertent executions by inexperienced pilots
might be possible."' 24
The Department of Transportation, Transportation Systems
Center (TSC) published their report on the Bonanza in January
1986. Because that study was conducted by the TSC, which is an
independent agency from the certifying directorate which has
certification cognizance over the Bonanza, the FAA Small Air-
plane Directorate published a "foreword" summarizing the re-
port and the official FAA conclusions after reviewing the TSC
report.'25 In that letter the FAA concludes:
The study found that the V-Tail Bonanza met the structural
requirements applicable at the time of initial FAA type certifica-
tion. However, three recommendations for further action were
made as follows:
1. Limited tests should be conducted to determine, defini-
tively, the tail failure mechanisms, and to define the actual struc-
tural margins of the Model 35 V-Tail Bonanza.
2. FAA should review airworthiness standards for general avi-
ation aircraft to determine their adequacy to properly certify
non-conventional tail aerodynamic configurations.
3. FAA should review pilot certification requirements for
high performance, single-engine aircraft.
The study identified no immediate safety concerns, provided
the airplane is operated within the approved flight envelope.
Therefore, no mandatory airworthiness or other immediate ac-
tion is being considered at this time.' 26
Following the SCR, support brackets were added to the lead-
ing edge of the tail, 2 7 and a modification kit was provided free
123 Id. at 59.
124 Id.
125 FAA Small Airplane Directorate, Foreword to BONANZA SCR REPORT, supra
note 62.
126 Id.
127 Used V-Tails, supra note 98, at 79.
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of charge by Beech Aircraft to all Bonanza owners. 121 In spite of
the conclusion to strengthen the tail assembly, the final result of
the SCR was that any structural weakness in the V-tail was found
outside the approved flight envelope. 1 9 Although-as a result
of the SCR-"the V-tail [became] one of the most-tested general
aviation airplanes," production was nevertheless over. °30 As one
writer stated, "What drove the final decision to discontinue the
V-tail [after more than thirty-five years of success] is open to
question, but the airplane was hurt by allegations of structural
weakness in the tail."''
C. MITSUBISHI MU-2
1. The Mitsubishi MU-2
The Mitsubishi MU-2 is a twin engine, high wing, turboprop
aircraft with seating for approximately six passengers.13 2 It is a
small,13 3 fast aircraft with a reputation for being a demanding
aircraft to fly.' 34 One unique feature of the aircraft is that it uses
spoilers instead of ailerons to provide bank control. The MU-2
also has unusually high wing loading in relation to comparable
airplanes." 5 At the time of this Comment, the MU-2 was no
longer in production.
128 Beech Will Modify V-Tail Bonanzas Built from 1951-82, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., May 18, 1987, at 108.
129 Used V-Tails, supra note 98, at 79.
130 Id.
131 Id. Since the SCR, the reputation of the Bonanza has recovered. In review-
ing the sales of used aircraft, the same author added:
V-tail Bonanza prices languished for a number of years as contro-
versy over the tail raged, but once everyone realized that it was what
it always had been-one fine airplane-the prices recovered and V-
tail Bonanzas are today among the best performers in the used air-
plane market. On average, a 30-year-old V-tail Bonanza sells for
over 150 percent of its new price.
Id.
132 The Mitsubishi MU-2 is made by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., ajapa-
nese Company, and was first flown on September 14, 1963. Both long body and
short body MU-2s were made with differing seating capacity. By 1986, over 755
MU-2s had been ordered from the manufacturer. JANE'S, supra note 8, at 170.
133 The empty weight of one MU-2B-60 (N72B as equipped), for example, was
7589 pounds. Uncontrolled Descent Cited by NTSB, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Aug. 27, 1984, at 83.
134 The aviation community nickname for the MU-2 is the "Rice Rocket," allud-
ing to its high performance characteristics. Barry Schiff, Test Pilot, AOPA PILOT,
Jan. 1996, at 95, 102.
135 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., SPECIAL CERTIFICATION REVIEW OF MITSUBISHI
MU-2 app. 1, at 6 (1984) (letter from Jim Burnett, Chairman, National Transpor-
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Because the aircraft was developed in Japan, the MU-2 was
certified under the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement between
the United States and Japan."s6 For production, completed air-
frames were shipped to the United States where engines and
other accessories were then added.1 3 7 Mitsubishi's original U.S.
representative finishing the aircraft was Mooney Aircraft Corpo-
ration. Later, Mitsubishi Aircraft International (MAI) obtained
a type certificate.1 3 Although the MU-2 is a very high perform-
ance aircraft, only one pilot is required for operation, and a pi-
lot type rating specifically for the MU-2 is not required. 139
2. Mitsubishi Accident History
On March 24, 1983, a Mitsubishi airplane Model MU-2B-60,
N72B, crashed near Jeffersonville, Georgia, killing all four per-
sons aboard. The airplane, engaged in an air-taxi operation, dis-
appeared from radar at an altitude of 18,000 feet shortly after the
pilot had established initial contact with the Atlanta Air Route
Traffic Control Center. Despite an intense and continuing inves-
tigation, the causal circumstances of the accident remain
undetermined. 4 0
The Mitsubishi MU-2 has a controversial safety record.'41 At
the time of the March 1983 crash, the MU-2 had been involved
in twenty-two fatal accidents in the preceding eight years that
were primarily related to uncontrolled collisions with the
ground, controlled collisions during cruise or instrument land-
ing approaches, or engine failures in various phases of flight. 14 2
The NTSB said that the circumstances of several of the accidents
tation Safety Board, forwarded to Honorable J. Lynn Helms, Administrator, Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (Aug. 24, 1983) (NTSB Safety Recommendation A-
83-56)) [hereinafter MU-2 SCR REPORT].
1936 The Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement was dated February 1, 1963. Id. at 3.
137 Id. at 4.
138 The MU-2 type certificates are A2PC and A10SW. Id. See supra notes 54-55
and accompanying text (discussing type certificates).
139 MU-2 SCR REPORT, supra note 135, at 8. See supra note 45 and accompany-
ing text (discussing pilot certificate "type rating").
140 MU-2 SCR REPORT, supra note 135, app. 1, at 1.
141 Although this Comment primarily addresses MU-2 accidents that lead up to
an FAA SCR of the MU-2 in 1983, today, more than 10 years later, the MU-2 is still
making headlines. On April 19, 1993, South Dakota Governor George S. Mickel-
son and seven other persons were killed when the MU-2 in which they were rid-
ing crashed near Dubuque, Iowa. Propeller Warning Issued Before Governor's Crash,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1993.
142 David M. North, NTSB Urges MU-2 Certification Review, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Sept. 12, 1983, at 60.
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were "puzzling" and that it may suggest that the causal circum-
stances may be design related.143 In investigating those acci-
dents, the NTSB had not been able to come up with a cause for
four of the eight accidents involving uncontrolled ground colli-
sion or for three of the six involving engine failure.144 Overall,
the NTSB file as of September 12, 1983, contained 183 accident
and incident reports, 53% of which were classified as "pilot mis-
handling" and 15% as unknown or miscellaneous cause.1 45 The
accident reports from some of the crashes include aircraft ac-
tions that are difficult to explain. One MU-2 had been operat-
ing normally in clear skies at 12,000 feet when it suddenly dove
into the ocean and crashed near Jacksonville, Florida. 146 An-
other MU-2 suddenly rolled and dove into the ground immedi-
ately after takeoff, crashing near Saratoga, Wyoming. 4 ' Still
another MU-2 that was being flown by a Mitsubishi corporate
executive pilot suddenly dove to the ground from an altitude of
several thousand feet. 48
3. FAA Special Certification Review of the Mitsubishi
Following the March 1983 MU-2 crash, the NTSB wrote to the
administrator of the FAA and recommended that the FAA con-
duct an SCR of the MU-2 "relative to the engines, fuel system,
autopilot, and flight control systems; flight in known icing con-
ditions; engine inoperative characteristics; and handling charac-
teristics during IMC landing approaches; and take the
appropriate action to correct any deficiencies identified."'' 49
The NTSB recommendation was based on "the continued in-
volvement of the Mitsubishi MU-2 in fatal accidents.., and sud-
den unexplained loss of control." 15
In response to the NTSB recommendation, the FAA assigned
an SCR team to review selected portions of the MU-2 design and
type certificate programs. 15 ' The SCR team for the MU-2 made
an initial review of the MU-2 and recommended the following
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 MU-2 SCR REPORT, supra note 135, at 5.
-, Id. app. 1, at 6.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. app. 1, at 7.
150 Id.
'5' Id. app. 5 (letter from Barry D. Clements, Manager, Aircraft Certification
Division (FAA, ACE-100), to Charles E. Arnold (FAA, ACE-106) (Sept. 14, 1983)
(assigning Mr. Arnold as MU-2 SCR team leader)) [hereinafter Clements letter].
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four areas for full team action: first, a review of accident files for
all MU-2 accidents with "unknown cause;" second, assignment of
a team to determine the causes of all MU-2 accidents; third, the
formation of an expert team to evaluate pilot workload, cockpit
arrangement, the possible need for type certification, aircraft
handling and single engine controllability, and pilot workload;
and fourth, the completion of a design review of the MU-2 fuel,
landing gear, autopilot/trim, and icing protection systems to de-
termine if improvements are necessary. 5 2 The scope, detail,
and process of the MU-2 SCR investigation was in accordance
with normal, stringent, FAA SCR procedures.15
3
After several months of research, testing, and analysis, the
MU-2 SCR team reported their findings to the FAA. In that re-
port, the SCR team concluded that "there was no evidence of
noncompliance with the certificating regulations ... or that an
identifiable safety hazard exist[ed]."154 The SCR team did make
several recommendations. First, it was recommended that sev-
eral of the aircraft systems be subject to further testing even
though there was no evidence of noncompliance with regula-
tions. 55 Additionally, the SCR team recommended several ac-
tions which they believed "would possibly enhance the overall
safety record of the airplane,"156 and concluded that the certifi-
cation of the design for single pilot operation without a type
certificate was proper.157 Several of the SCR recommendations
addressed the aircraft systems designs as they pertain to use by
the pilots158 and included certain revisions to the operating
manual to "ensure more consistent understanding and applica-
tion of information" found in the manual.1 59
152 MU-2 SCR REPORT, supra note 135, at 2-3.
153 Clements letter, supra note 151; see also supra notes 84-87 and accompanying
text (discussing FAA Order No. 8110.4A pertaining to the process of conducting
a special certification review).
154 MU-2 SCR REPORT, supra note 135, at 6.
155 Id. at 7. The SCR team recommended that the ice protection, pitot-static,
and electrical systems as well as the environmental system turbine be further ana-
lyzed. Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 8.
158 In particular, the SCR team recommendations addressed settings for the
landing gear warning horn, location of oxygen on-off control, location of
autopilot/trim disconnect button, labeling of device circuit breaker, and location
of the pilot's turn-and-bank indicator. Id. at 7-8.
159 Id. at 8.
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D. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SPECIAL CERTIFICATION REVIEW
1. General Conclusions
As both the Beech Bonanza and Mitsubishi MU-2 SCRs illus-
trate, often the aircraft designs subject to an SCR are found to
be in compliance with the certification requirements. Designs
that have been subject to the SCR, however, also enjoy the bene-
fit of having passed an extremely rigorous review conducted by a
team of experts who undoubtedly enter the process with careful
skepticism. As noted in the discussion on the V-tail Bonanza, as
a result of the SCR, "the V-tail [became] one of the most-tested
general aviation airplanes." 160 As will be addressed later in this
Comment, when a legal action is brought challenging the safety
or adequacy of an aircraft design, any design that has been sub-
ject to an SCR investigation should enjoy a strong presumption
of safety.
A recurring theme in SCR studies is the need for better pilot
training and the inter-relationship between the pilot and the air-
craft. In the Bonanza study, the SCR team concluded that train-
ing in high-performance aircraft was needed. 161 The Mitsubishi
review included a number of recommendations relating to pilot
ergonometrics. 162 This emphasis on pilot training, however, is
not unique to the two studies reviewed above in detail. Several
recent SCR investigations on other aircraft designs also high-
light the emphasis on better pilot training that often follows
from an SCR investigation.
2. Better Pilot Training
In 1994, the FAA conducted an SCR investigation into the
Robinson R22/44 helicopters following several fatal accidents.
After the investigation, the FAA said that the R22/44 helicopters
did comply with certification requirements even though the
NTSB continued to express concern. The manufacturer said
that some of the accidents were caused by pilot error and rec-
ommended pilot experience and training. 63 Also in 1994, the
FAA completed an SCR investigation into high-altitude stability
of the MD-1 1. Although the MD-i 1 design was generally vindi-
cated, the NTSB emphasized that pilots should receive training
160 Used V-Tails, supra note 98, at 79.
161 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
163 Ramon Lopez, Nothing To Be Afraid Of FLIGHT INT'L, Mar. 15, 1995.
620
FAA SPECIAL CERTIFICATION REVIEW
in recovery from high-altitude upsets.16 1 In 1992, the FAA com-
pleted an exhaustive SCR investigation into the PA46 Piper
Malibu 165 following seven in-flight breakups. After the review,
the FAA found the design complied with certification require-
ments, but strongly recommended improved education and
training of pilots in high performance airplanes.166
The emphasis on pilot training following the SCR investiga-
tion of so many different aircraft designs is a significant com-
mentary on the interdependence of aircraft design with pilot
training and certification. As discussed earlier in this Comment,
the regulatory scheme for certification of pilots and aircraft are
complex and closely related. Recall that pilot certification for
large or complex aircraft requires not only a basic pilot certifi-
cate, but often an aircraft model-specific "type rating."'67 Recall
also, that one aspect of the Mitsubishi MU-2 review addressed
the question of whether that model aircraft was so complex that
a type rating should be required. 1
68
The Bonanza and MU-2 reviews demonstrate that the FAA
and NTSB clearly understand that pilot training and aircraft
complexity cannot be separated. That recognition should also
be critical in legal review of aircraft design. It is not possible to
review an aircraft design by itself without regard to the associ-
ated training and checkout that the pilot must legally receive.
An aircraft design that may seem to be exceptionally compli-
cated to operate may not be unreasonably dangerous if signifi-
cant training is required in order to legally fly it. The
interdependence of aircraft design certification and pilot certifi-
cation will be addressed further in the subsequent sections of
this Comment where federal preemption is discussed.
164 Edward H. Phillips, Air Transport NTSB: Pilots Need Training for High-Altitude
Stalls, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 21, 1994, at 43.
165 The Piper Malibu (PA46-310P) is a high performance, pressurized, single-
engine aircraft originally developed and manufactured by the Piper Aircraft,
Corp. of Vero Beach Florida (now defunct). Originally certified in September
1983, the company claimed the Malibu was "the world's first cabin class, pres-
surized, piston powered, single-engine aircraft." JANE'S, supra note 8, at 487-88.
166 FAA Clears Malibu, with Warning, FLIGHT INT'L, Feb. 26, 1992.
167 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW: STATE
PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS FOR AIRCRAFT DESIGNS
DEVELOPED, TESTED, AND CERTIFIED UNDER FEDERAL
CERTIFICATION REGULATIONS
A. PREEMPTION INTRODUCTION
Although this is not intended to be a comprehensive Com-
ment on federal preemption in aviation law, 69 judicial analysis
of implied or conflict preemption should be influenced by the
SCR process. First, the SCR procedure provides a feedback
mechanism in the aircraft certification process that makes the
overall scheme more comprehensive, and which makes the reg-
ulation of aircraft design largely self-policing. The self-policing
aspect of the regulatory scheme is evidence of the intent of
lawmakers to have the federal regulatory system include its own
corrective processes, eliminating the need for state supervision.
Second, the SCR procedure serves as a continuing link between
aircraft design certification and pilot training and certification.
The interdependence of aircraft design and pilot certification
was demonstrated during SCR investigations for a number of
aircraft as discussed in the preceding section of this Com-
ment.1 70 This section will review the background of preemption
analysis in aviation law and several recent cases on the subject;
then, it will comment on those cases in light of the SCR process.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR PREEMPTION
The federal preemption doctrine of federal law over state law
springs from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.'17 The
Supremacy Clause renders invalid any state laws that are incon-
sistent with federal laws. An early case addressing the
supremacy of federal law was M'Culloch v. Maryland,172 where a
state law that attempted to tax the Bank of United States was
held invalid as a burden on federal power to regulate cur-
169 Several detailed articles addressing federal preemption in aviation law have
been written recently and would be good references for a thorough discussion of
preemption in aviation law. See Mary A. Wells & David Mayhan, Federal Preemption
of Strict Liability Claims in Aviation Litigation: A Fresh Look, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 693
(1992); Geoffrey M. Hand, Comment, Should Juries Decide Aircraft Design? Cleve-
land v. Piper Aircraft Corp. and Federal Preemption of State Tort Law, 29 U.S.F. L.
REv. 741 (1995).
170 See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
171 U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
172 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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rency. 175 As will be illustrated below, preemption may be ex-
pressly stated in a federal statute, 174 or it may be deemed to be
implied either by the nature of the federal laws or as a result of
conflict with state law. In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,175 the
Supreme Court explained:
[Implied preemption may] be evidenced in several ways. The
scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make rea-
sonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the
same subject. 176
The Court also noted that total preemption is not necessary;
state law can be partially preempted such that it is unenforce-
able only to the extent that it conflicts with federal law.17 7 In all
cases, congressional intent "is the ultimate touchstone of pre-
emption analysis."178
C. APPLICATION OF PREEMPTION IN AVIATION LAW
1. Introduction
The extensive nature of the federal regulations pertaining to
aircraft certification raises the question of implied and conflict
preemption. "Did Congress intend to totally occupy the field
with respect to design of aircraft, so that the statute and regula-
tions implied preempt a state court jury from determining the
existence of a design defect?"1 79 The Federal Aviation Act of
1958 did not contain an express preemption provision, but did
include a "savings clause" that provided that the Act was not to
173 Id. at 427 ("[T)he sovereignty of the state ... is subordinate to, and may be
controlled by the constitution (sic] of the United States.").
174 See, e.g., The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (expressly void-
ing state and common law copyright for works of authorship that would be cov-
ered by the Copyright Act).
175 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
176 Id. at 157 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947) (citations omitted)). In the situation where pervasive federal regulation is
presumed to preclude any state action, that type of preemption is known as "field
preemption."
177 Id. at 158.
178 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing Malone v.
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978), which quoted Retail Clerks v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
179 Wells & Mayhan, supra note 169, at 694.
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alter "remedies" then available under the law.' The argument
against preemption is that because the Act allowed prior reme-
dies to remain, that implies that the Act was not intended to
"occupy a given field."1"' The Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, 182 however, added an express preemption provision apply-
ing to attempted state regulation of rates, routes, or services,"'3
but did not address aircraft design certification.
Recent cases have addressed aircraft design defects and have
rejected the federal preemption assertion that federal regula-
tions over aircraft design preclude common law or state findings
for defective design. The following is a brief review of two fed-
eral appellate cases which have been much discussed.
2. Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc.
In Public Health Trust v. Lake Aircraft, Inc.,'84 the court of ap-
peals vacated and remanded a trial court's summary judgment
for the defendant Lake Aircraft. In this case, plaintiff William
Dee was a passenger in an aircraft manufactured by defendant
Lake, which possessed a valid airworthiness certificate at the
time. Dee was seriously and permanently injured when the am-
phibious aircraft struck a rocky bank during an attempted take-
off. Dee sued the manufacturer alleging negligence and strict
liability for the design of the passenger seat averring that the
seat design enhanced his injuries. 8 5 The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendant, ruling that Dee's state
law claims were preempted by the federal aircraft certification
laws and that no violation of the federal design and perform-
ance standards was demonstrated. On appeal, however, the
180 The original savings clause language provided that "[n]othing contained in
this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at com-
mon law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such
remedies." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b),
108 Stat. 1379, 1383 (1994). The Code has recently been updated and the new
language states simply that "[a] remedy under this part is in addition to any other
remedies provided by law." 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1994). The statutory notes,
however, indicate that the change was not meant to modify the law but only "to
eliminate unnecessary words and for clarity." Id.
1s1 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1104 (1986).
182 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.).
183 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108
Stat. 1379 (1994) (now recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (1994)).
184 992 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1993).
185 Id. at 292.
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court of appeals reversed holding that even though the FAA had
promulgated airworthiness standards, including specific per-
formance standards for seats, berths, safety belts, and harnesses,
the federal certification regulations did not preempt state com-
mon law remedies. 186 The court of appeals reached this conclu-
sion by reasoning that because there was an express preemption
provision relating to rates, routes, or services and that by appli-
cation of the statutory interpretation principle of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius (meaning that the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another), those matters not expressly addressed
were, by definition, not preempted. 187 This conclusion was also
supported by the recent Supreme Court decision in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc.,'88 which held that preemptive language
should be narrowly construed in light of a presumption against
preemption. 189
3. Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.
In Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,' 90 the court of appeals up-
held a district court ruling that the Federal Aviation Act does
not expressly or impliedly preempt New Mexico state law tort
claims. In this case, the pilot of a "Super Cub," 9 ' tail-dragger
aircraft, manufactured by defendant Piper Aircraft, was seriously
injured when the aircraft struck a vehicle on the runway during
an attempt to take off while towing a glider. The aircraft had
been modified, replacing the front seat with a movie camera in
order to film a commercial, and was being piloted from the rear
seat at the time of the accident. The plaintiff alleged that the
airplane was defective because it had inadequate rear seat pref-
light visibility and lacked a rear seat shoulder harness. 192 The
court of appeals found for the plaintiff on the preemption chal-
lenge using reasoning similar to that used in Lake Aircraft. First,
the court reviewed the original statute and the savings clause.
The court concluded that the absence of any express preemp-
tion clause in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,19 together with
186 Id. at 295.
187 Id. at 294-95.
188 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
189 Id. at 505.
190 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 918 (1993).
191 The aircraft was a Piper Super Cub Model PA-18-150, manufactured and
sold by Piper in 1970.
192 Piper Aircraft, 985 F.2d at 1441.
193 See supra note 25.
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the recognition of tort liability for design defects at the time the
Act was implemented "resulted in the states retaining their tradi-
tional regulatory powers in this area. ' 194 The court cited Morales
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.195 as support for their conclusion.
Next, the court examined the express preemption clause added
with the Deregulation Act of 1978 and concluded that the addi-
tion of an express preemption of some subjects could be inter-
preted as expressly not preempting all others. This is the same
logic applied in Lake Aircraft.1 96 The court concluded that be-
cause the Deregulation Act of 1978 added a preemption clause
that did not address state tort claims, that act was evidence that
such tort claims were not intended to be preempted. 197 The
court next rejected a conflict preemption theory concluding
that it would not be a "a physical impossibility" to comply with
both state and federal law.1 98 Finally, the court distinguished a
series of cases that had held that states were preempted from
requiring airbags for automobiles by the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act because that Act gave several choices
in passenger restraints. For a state to eliminate the federally
provided choice "would, in effect, remove the element of choice
authorized in Safety Standard 208 [and] would frustrate the fed-
eral regulatory scheme.1 99
4. Cases Finding Preemption Jbr Comparison
While recent decisions in the court of appeals have been hesi-
tant to find federal preemption in aircraft design, cases that
have found federal preemption of state law suggest that the basis
194 Piper Aircraft, 985 F.2d at 1443.
195 504 U.S. 374 (1992). The court in Piper Aircraft describes Morales as holding
that state truth-in-advertising laws were preempted under the express preemption
clause added with the Deregulation Act of 1978, but would not have been pre-
empted under the original act with the savings clause. Piper Aircraft, 985 F.2d at
1443. This misconstrues the Morales decision. In fact, the Morales opinion does
not say that the state truth-in-advertising laws would not have been preempted
before the deregulation act. The Morales opinion says that the general savings
clause does not trump the specific preemption statute. Morales, 504 U.S. at 385.
Morales holds that because the specific subject in the case was clearly preempted
by an express statute, the general savings clause did not allow states to retain their
regulatory power. Id.
196 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
197 Piper Aircraft, 985 F.2d at 1443.
198 Id. at 1445 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963)).
199 Id. at 1446 (quoting Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 827
(Ilth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990)).
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for finding preemption is not so different than the situation
presented in aircraft design regulations. Several case examples
follow to illustrate situations where federal preemption has been
found.
a. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 2° ° Justice White, for the
Supreme Court, upheld the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington ruling that the State of Washing-
ton's tanker laws regulating the size and design of oil tankers in
Puget Sound were preempted by federal law and hence unen-
forceable. In this case, Washington law required certain size
tankers to meet "standard safety features," which specified cer-
tain design aspects, engine horse power requirements, naviga-
tion equipment requirements, and other items.20 1 The Court
concluded that the Washington statute was preempted by the
Federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA).2°2 The
Court reviewed the purpose of the PWSA as establishing "'com-
prehensive minimum standards of design, construction, altera-
tion, repair, maintenance, and operation' for vessels carrying
certain cargoes in bulk, primarily oil and fuel tankers ' 2 3 and
concluded, "[A]s we see it, Congress did not anticipate that a
vessel found to be in compliance with the Secretary's design and
construction regulations . . .would nevertheless be barred by
state law ... on the ground that its design characteristics consti-
tute an undue hazard."20 4 The Court observed in regard to the
federal statute language of "minimum standards," "We are un-
convinced that because [the act] speaks of. . . 'minimum stan-
dards' [that it] requires recognition of state authority to impose
higher standards than the Secretary has prescribed."20 5 In its
analysis, the Court noted that the goals of both the state and
federal laws were the same: to protect the environment and as-
sure vessel safety.20 6 The Court concluded that Congress "in-
tended uniform national standards for design and construction
200 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
201 Id. at 160.
202 Id. at 168. The PWSA was originally codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 391a (1970
& Supp. V) (recently recodified in various sections under the same title including
46 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 3301, 3305-3307 (1994)).
203 Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. at 161 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 391a(1)).
204 Id. at 163-64.
205 Id. at 168 n.19 (citations omitted).
206 Id. at 161.
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of tankers" and as a result a state law with the same purpose
imposing more stringent requirements would be invalid under
the Supremacy Clause.20 7
b. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.
In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,208 the Supreme
Court affirmed the district court and court of appeals in holding
invalid a city ordinance prohibiting jet aircraft from taking off
from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport between the hours of
11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. 20 9 The Court held that Congress had
preempted state and local control over aircraft noise by the en-
actment of the Federal Aviation Act and the Noise Control Act.
In this case, the opinion begins with a quote from Cooley v. Board
of Wardens,210 where Justice Curtis observes that some subjects
"imperatively deman [d] a single uniform rule, operating equally
on the commerce of the United States in every port," while
other subjects should lead to diverse conclusions in order to
"meet the local necessities. ' 211 The Court noted that the regula-
tory grant of power to the FAA was intended to "insure the safety
of aircraft and the efficient utilization of ... airspace. ' 212 The
Court went on to reason that night curfew on flights would im-
pact flight schedules during the day, which would interfere with
efficient use of the airspace and hence conflict with the federal
mission.213 The Court noted that "[i] t is the pervasive nature of
the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to
conclude that there is pre-emption. ''2 14 In reviewing the perva-
sive scheme of federal regulation, the Court was persuaded by
the words of Justice Jackson who stated:
Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander
about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal
permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of feder-
ally certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal
commands. The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught
up in an elaborate and detailed system of controls. 2 5
207 Id. at 163, 165.
208 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
209 Id. at 626.
210 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
211 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 625 (quoting Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319).
212 Id. at 627.
213 Id. at 627-28.
214 Id. at 633.
215 Id. at 633-34 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292,
303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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In City of Burbank, the Court stated: "If we were to uphold the
Burbank ordinance and a significant number of municipalities
followed suit, it is obvious that fractionalized control of the tim-
ing of takeoffs and landings would severely limit the flexibility of
FAA in controlling air traffic flow. '2 16
c. State Securities Co. v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc.
In State Securities Co. v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc.,217 the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that Congress had pre-
empted the field of registrations and liens pertaining to title to
aircraft under Title 49, Section 1403 of the United States
Code. 18 As a result, state recording statutes were not applica-
ble. The court reasoned that by providing a federal system for
registration of conveyances, Congress had preempted that field.
This same conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court in
Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket,2 19 where Justice White held that
federal law preempted state law that would allow undocumented
or unrecorded transfers of interest in aircraft to affect innocent
third parties. 2
D. CONCLUSION: HISTORICALLY, COMPLIANCE WITH
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS HAS NOT SHIELDED
MANUFACTURERS FROM ALLEGATIONS OF
DEFECTIVE DESIGN
As illustrated by the Lake Aircraft and Piper Aircraft cases, re-
cent court of appeals cases have held that regulations passed
under the Federal Aviation Act do not preempt state actions for
negligent design. The conclusions in these cases, however,
seem to be a reflection more on current political attitude than
on an analytic analysis of the law.
While the Federal Aviation Act does not expressly preempt
state review of aircraft design, there is a strong basis for implied
preemption based on the pervasive nature of the aviation laws
and the need for national uniformity. The rationale applied in
Atlantic Richfield, City of Burbank, and State Securities supports a
216 Id. at 639.
217 355 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1966).
218 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1988), repealed ly Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat.
1379, 1383 (1994) (recently recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 44107 (1994)).
219 462 U.S. 406 (1983).
220 Id. at 409-10.
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preemption argument for aircraft design; the existence and na-
ture of the SCR process further strengthens this proposition. 221
As suggested previously, judicial analysis of implied or conflict
preemption should be influenced by the special certification re-
view process. The SCR procedure provides a feedback mecha-
nism in the aircraft certification process that makes the overall
scheme more comprehensive and makes the regulation of air-
craft design self-policing. As policing mechanisms, both the
FAA regulations and state actions for negligent design serve pre-
cisely the same purpose: to protect the public from unsafe de-
signs and to encourage safety improvements in designs when
they are identified. As the Supreme Court noted in Atlantic
Richfield, where state and federal laws serve the same purpose,
imposition of more stringent laws by the states is prohibited by
the Supremacy Clause.222 Additionally, as a feedback mecha-
nism, the existence of the SCR process makes some suggestion
as to the legislative intent. By including the SCR process,223 the
inference is appropriate that the intent of the federal legislation
was to provide its own internal corrective processes-that state
review of designs was not needed to police designs for safety.
In addition to its role as a policing mechanism, the SCR pro-
cedure serves as a continuing link between aircraft design certi-
fication and pilot training and certification. In this role, the
SCR process is a feedback mechanism that ties aircraft design to
pilot training assuring that relative safety in design is comple-
mented by appropriate training for pilots.
The relationship between aircraft design and pilot training
can be illustrated, in part, by Piper Aircraft. In that case, the
court focused on the limited forward visibility from the rear seat
of the Piper Super Cub224 and concluded that the manufacturer
221 A very compelling argument for preemption is presented by one commen-
tator who suggests that the courts in both Lake Aircraft and Piper Aircraft miscon-
strued the import of both the savings clause and the express preemption
provision. Hand, supra note 169, at 741.
222 Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. at 165.
223 The SCR power is exercised under 49 U.S.C. § 44709 (1994). See supra note
83 and accompanying text (discussing the SCR power).
224 The Piper Super Cub (actually a series of models including the PA-18-90,
PA-18-108, PA-18-125, and PA-18-150), an immensely popular aircraft, was manu-
factured by Piper Aircraft for almost 50 years. Introduced in 1949, production
continued into the early 1980s. Super Cubs were used by the U.S. Government
during World War II as trainers and were procured by the U.S. Army in 1950-51
(as L-21s). JOE CHRISTY, THE PIPER CLAssics 7-8 (1988). The history of the Super
Cub goes back to the Piper J-3 from which it evolved. The Piper J-3, which be-
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should have raised the rear seat.225 The court overlooks, how-
ever, that for many years pilot training for operation of an air-
craft with tail-wheel landing gear has included detailed, specific
instruction in the taxi, takeoff, and landing of aircraft with that
type of gear and specifically in dealing with the reduced forward
visibility that is inherent in that type of design.226 In a thirty-
year-old FAA publication 2 on basic flight training, the follow-ing warning is offered:
Since a tailwheel type airplane rests on the tailwheel as well as the
main landing wheels, it assumes a nose high attitude when on the
ground. In most cases this places the engine cowling high
enough to restrict the pilot's vision of the area directly ahead of
the airplane. Consequently, objects directly ahead of the airplane are
difficult, if not impossible, to see. To observe and avoid colliding
with any objects or hazardous surface conditions such as chuck
holes or mire, the pilot should alternately turn the nose from
one side to the other-that is zigzag, or make a series of short S-
turns while taxiing forward.228
As indicated, limited visibility is inherent in a tailwheel aircraft
and requires specific pilot awareness and action. Limited visibil-
ity, however, is only part of the challenge in flying that type of
airplane. The FAA publication adds, "taxiing with a steerable
nosewheel [tricycle landing gear aircraft229 ] requires less special
came popular in the late 1930s, was a common training aircraft for many years.
Prior to World War II, the Cub was used extensively in the Civilian Pilot Training
Program (CPTP), and of the more than 435,000 student pilots trained there,
"[f]our out of five won their wings in [the Cub], and according to the FAA, three
out of four combat pilots in World War II 'learned their ABCs in it."' Id. at 6.
This background on the Super Cub and J-3 is provided to illustrate that the de-
sign being attacked in Piper Aircraft had been proven by almost 60 years of use
prior to the accident.
225 Piper Aircraft, 985 F.2d at 1445.
226 The court also overlooks the fact that literally hundreds of thousands of pilots
from the 1930s to the 1980s successfully learned to fly in Cubs (and other very
similar models) by applying various pilot techniques to eliminate the hazard of
the reduced forward visibility of the Cub. See supra note 224 (discussing pilot
training in the Cub).
227 An old publication was selected to see the type of warnings that were of-
fered before Piper Aircraft caused the tailwheel aircraft to become notorious.
228 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., FLIGHT TRAINING HANDBOOK 55 (1965) (empha-
sis added) [hereinafter FLIGHT TRAINING HANDBOOK].
229 Many newer aircraft employ "tricycle" gear with a nose rather than tail
wheel. While tricycle gear aircraft do not have the forward visibility restrictions
found in tailwheel aircraft, they may weigh more and can be mechanically more
complex.
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pilot technique" than with a tail-wheel type aircraft.23' The
tailwheel design has been used almost since the beginning of
manned flight and is well known to require skill to handle. One
aviation consultant said the following about tailwheel aircraft:
The tailwheel of an airplane with dynamically unstable main
landing gear is serious business. In motion, it's like trying to
shoot an arrow feather-end first. The center of gravity is behind
the main gear, so ... the airplane [will] want to swap ends. The
resulting maneuver is called a ground loop. The pilot must be
trained and experienced to manually overcome the dynamic in-
stability of such a landing gear. 3'
In regard to one tailwheel aircraft, the PT-17 Stearman, the
same author added: "If there is an incompetent pilot in the
driver's seat, he is going to go for a ride."23 2 Because many air-
craft today are tricycle gear airplanes, the FAA has recently
amended the Federal Aviation Regulations to legally require
training in tailwheel airplanes before a pilot may act as pilot in
command.3 3 While the FAA training recommendations regard-
ing tailwheel aircraft were standard training at the time of the
accident in Piper Aircraft,23 4 the regulation legally requiring
tailwheel training was not added until after the accident in Piper
Aircraft.23 5 By adding a new regulation specifically addressing
the training required for a particular type of aircraft design, the
FAA is making a clear statement that they understand the rela-
tionship between aircraft design and pilot training. The FAA
action recognizes that some aspects of aircraft are best ad-
dressed by changing the design, and other aspects, perhaps due
to cost, complexity, practicality, or the state of technology, are
better addressed with pilot training. The fact that the FAA
amended the pilot training requirements and not the tailwheel
design certification requirements is evidence that they balanced
230 Id.
231 CHRISTY, supra note 224, at 9 (quoting David Blanton, President of Javelin
Aircraft).
232 Id. (suggesting that the PT-17 is a difficult aircraft not to ground loop).
233 14 C.F.R. § 61.31(g) (1996). The text of § 61.31(g) provides, in part: "No
person may act as pilot in command of a tailwheel airplane unless that pilot has
received flight instruction from an authorized flight instructor who has found the
pilot competent to operate a tailwheel airplane and has made a one time en-
dorsement so stating in the pilot's logbook." Id.
234 FLIGHT TRAINING HANDBOOK, supra note 228, at 53-55 (discussing tailwheel
training from 1965).
235 The accident in Piper Aircraft occurred in 1983. Piper Aircraft, 985 F.2d at
1440.
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both aircraft design and pilot training factors to achieve the re-
quired safety objective. For the court in PiperAircraft to presume
that all that was needed to make the Super Cub safe was for the
rear seat to be raised is to ignore the design tradeoffs that would
accompany an alternative design (perhaps a raised seat would
only permit short pilots to fit or cause an interference between
the pilots knees and the controls) and appropriate pilot training
as an alternative way to balance design issues against aircraft
cost, complexity, or handling characteristics.
The FAA has taken a similar approach for high performance
aircraft by requiring specific training regulations for high per-
formance aircraft to ensure that the more complex systems are
adequately understood by the pilots. 236 This training require-
ment recognizes that high performance airplanes, which are still
small enough to be exempt from type rating requirements, can
overwhelm a novice pilot and can also quickly build dangerously
excessive speed. The high performance training requirement
would apply to pilots of the Beech Bonanza.23 v Similarly, the
FAA has recently added additional training requirements for pi-
lots of small aircraft that are capable of high altitude flight. 238
The high altitude training requirement recognizes that aircraft
handling, aerodynamics, stall, and buffet characteristics, as well
as meteorology and pilot physiological factors, are different at
higher altitudes than typically found at lower altitudes. 239 One
outcome of the Piper Malibu SCR was the recommendation for
better pilot training.240 As a high altitude pressurized aircraft,
236 14 C.F.R. § 61.31(e). Section 61.31(e) provides in part:
A person ... may not act as pilot in command of an airplane that
has more than 200 horsepower, or that has a retractable landing
gear, flaps, and a controllable propeller... unless he has received
flight instruction from an authorized flight instructor who has certi-
fied in his logbook that he is competent to pilot [such] an airplane.
Id.
237 See supra note 96 (detailing Bonanza specifications).
238 14 C.F.R. § 61.31(f). The text of § 61.31(f) provides, in part:
[N]o person may act as pilot in command of a pressurized airplane
that has a service ceiling or maximum operating altitude, whichever
is lower, above 25,000 feet MSL unless that person has completed
the ground and flight training specified in paragraphs (f)(1) (i)
and (ii) of this section and has received a logbook or training rec-
ord endorsement from an authorized instructor certifying satisfac-
tory completion of the training. The training shall consist of ....
Id. (very detailed training requirements are included).
239 Id. § 61.31 (f) (1)(i)-(ii).
240 See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (discussing Piper Malibu
SCR).
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this new regulation would address the FAA concern with the
Malibu as raised in the SCR.
As illustrated above, in Piper Aircraft, the court focused solely
on the aircraft design, but the comprehensive federal regula-
tions compel that pilot training be pulled into the analysis as
well. The SCR process provides a tight link between aircraft de-
sign and pilot training because an SCR can result in a legally
mandated set of pilot training or experience requirements to be
completed before a pilot can operate a particular type of air-
craft. The existence of this feedback mechanism, which ties to-
gether both aircraft design and pilot training, suggests that the
scope of federal aviation regulation is complete and that there is
no room for state supplementation without undermining the ef-
ficacy of the federal process. The interaction between aircraft
certification and pilot training also suggests that the "elaborate
and detailed system of [federal] controls" 4' that the Supreme
Court relied on in City of Burbank to find preemption in aircraft
noise regulation are also present in the complex web of regula-
tions pertaining to aircraft and pilot certification. Just as Justice
Douglas expressed concern in City of Burbank over the potential
for "fractionalized control of the timing of takeoffs and land-
ings, '2 42 so too can state involvement lead to "fractionalized con-
trol" of aircraft design. The cost of developing and certifying an
aircraft is already enormous. 43 To develop, test, and certify a
design that meets federal regulations in addition to specific, dif-
ferent requirements for fifty states would approach impossibility.
The plain intent of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was to pro-
mote aviation.2 " An interpretation that allows each of the states
to introduce diverse lay opinions regarding the adequacy of an
aircraft design certified under the federal regulations would ef-
fectively halt or prohibit any aircraft design that states might
choose to target. This is clearly repugnant to the legislative in-
tent of the Act. As Justice Curtis observed in Cooley, some sub-
jects "imperatively deman[d] a single uniform rule, operating
241 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633-34 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Min-
nesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also supra notes
208-16 and accompanying text (discussing City of Burbank).
242 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 639.
243 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing the cost of certifying a
new aircraft design).
244 See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative in-
tent behind the Federal Aviation Act of 1958).
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equally on the commerce of the United States in every port. '245
Where, as in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, "It]he grant of
commercial power to Congress does not contain any terms
which expressly exclude the states from exercising an authority
over its subject-matter," the power of the states must neverthe-
less be excluded "because the nature of the power, thus granted
to Congress, requires that a similar authority should not exist in
the states."246
V. CONCLUSION
The FAA SCR is a feedback mechanism in the complex
scheme of federal regulations governing the certification of air-
craft design. The SCR process can be invoked by the FAA when
a series of accidents call into question the safety of an aircraft.
In SCR investigations, the design of the aircraft involved has
been previously certified under all applicable FAA regulations
but is again subjected to testing, documentation, and evaluation
to confirm safety of the design and conformance with certifica-
tion criteria. The aircraft may be grounded or subjected to op-
erational limitations during the course of the SCR. As
illustrated with the Beechcraft Bonanza and Mitsubishi MU-2
SCR investigations, the SCR process assures that certified de-
signs can be continually monitored for safety and that the certi-
fication criteria can be re-evaluated when new information
warrants such a re-evaluation. The SCR process also serves as a
link between aircraft design and pilot training, assuring that ap-
propriate pilot training will be required for specific aircraft de-
signs. When examining the scheme of federal regulation over
aircraft and pilot certification, the SCR process illustrates the
comprehensive nature of the federal regulations and clarifies
the intent that the federal certification requirements be the ex-
clusive requirements for U.S. civil aircraft design.
245 Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
246 Id. at 318.
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